A self-hosted application backplane The backplane for the internal apps your AI agents build — they inherit compute, data, secrets, identity and secure connectivity, instead of wiring it.
The agent asks for a capability — a database, a secret, a connection to the ERP — and Beamhall provisions it behind policy, handing back a handle, never the wiring.
A reliable path, not improvised infrastructure. Beamhall gives the agent one documented tool surface and a built-in knowledge base, so it ships the same known-good, governed way every time — and nothing leaves your environment.
IT decides where apps run. A private VM, a dedicated VPC, or fully on-prem, per workspace. The gateway is the single ingress and egress is default-deny — no security group to misconfigure into accidental public access.
No get_secret tool; set_secret is write-only; create_database returns a key and a file path, never a connection string.
Every action passes a single Policy Enforcement Point and is recorded on a hash-chained, append-only audit log, verified at boot.
cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, read-only rootfs, seccomp + AppArmor, cgroup v2 ceilings, userns-remap — chosen by IT, re-asserted every deploy.
A per-workspace bridge with an always-deny set: cloud metadata, link-local, host, management subnet. The agent has no tool to widen it.
Flip one field to run under gVisor (runsc), a userspace kernel — no KVM required. A Firecracker microVM tier is the documented upgrade path.
A negative-security suite (TestAgentCannot) makes a builder holding every scope try to read secrets, escape, and exfiltrate — and proves each attempt fails.